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Abstract
This study analyses cost stickiness under the dilemma between current profi-
tability and future sales increase. When activity decreases firms are faced to 
keep profitability adjusting resources, while they should also consider long term 
consequences and keep slack resources which allow building firms capacities to 
adapt to external challenges and take advantage of future opportunities. We find 
empirical evidence that changes in current firm profitability and one year ahead 
sales increase significantly influence resource adjustment in periods when sales 
decrease. We find a significant moderating effect of changes in profitability, as well 
as a significant stressing effect of one year ahead sales increase, on cost stickiness. 
Key words: Cost stickiness, profitability, increases in sales, slack, resource 
adjustment.
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Resumen
Este estudio analiza la histéresis de los costes bajo el dilema de conseguir una 
rentabilidad inmediata o futuros incrementos de ventas. Cuando la actividad dismi-
nuye las empresas se enfrentan al dilema de mantener la rentabilidad recortando 
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gastos, pero tienen que considerar también las consecuencias a largo plazo de 
mantener capacidad sobrante o recursos de holgura que les permitan construir 
capacidades para adaptarse a los desafíos que les plantea el entorno, así como 
afrontar con ventaja las oportunidades futuras. En este trabajo encontramos 
evidencia empírica de que los cambios en la rentabilidad presente, así como los 
aumentos futuros en las ventas influencian significativamente el ajuste de recursos 
de las empresas en los períodos en los que disminuyen las ventas. Encontramos un 
efecto moderador de los cambios en la rentabilidad presente, así como un efecto 
acentuador de los aumentos futuros en las ventas, en la histéresis de los costes.
Palabras clave: Histéresis de los costes, rentabilidad económica, aumento de 
las ventas, recursos sobrantes, disminución de costes.
1. Introduction
Cost stickiness has attracted considerable academic attention during recent 
years. Cooper and Kaplan (1998, p. 246-7) alleged that two steps are required 
for costs decrease when activity decreases: reducing demands for resources 
and lowering the spending. According to this, costs’ response to an increase in 
activity is significantly stronger in comparison to their response to a decrease 
in activity. This type of cost behaviour is labelled sticky, and stickiness the cor-
respondent effect. Therefore, sticky costs occur due to asymmetric adjustments 
of resources when activity increases and decreases. 
Anderson et al. (2007) identified three factors causing cost stickiness: fixity of 
costs, management failure to control costs, and management decisions to maintain 
resources during a downturn. In the same vein, Yasukata and Kajiwara (2011) 
distinguished two different causes of cost stickiness: as a result of managers 
being unable to adjust firms’ capacity, and as the deliberate decision of manag-
ers. On the one hand cost downward adjustment is more difficult than upward 
adjustment because firms face difficulties in removing committed resources. 
Some costs, as for example maintenance or general services, are difficult to 
avoid. The adjustment of resources entails also increases in severance pay for 
employees, returns of materials and services, organizational adjustments, etc. 
In this respect, some prior studies found empirical evidence on the inability of 
managers to adjust resources, as well as on the incidence of objective factors 
and firm characteristics on cost stickiness (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003; Calleja 
et al., 2006; Argilés-Bosch and García-Blandón, 2011; Dalla and Perego, 2014; 
Balakrisnan et al., 2014). On the other hand, other studies stress on the deliberate 
decisions of managers, depending on expectations (Cooper and Kaplan, 1992; 
Yasukata and Kawijara, 2011; Banker et al., 2014), past sales growth (Anderson 
et al., 2013), the type of adjusted resources (Balakrishnan and Gruca, 2008), 
manager’s building incentives (Chen et al., 2012), CEO compensation and 
expectations for value creation of input resource expenditures (Banker et al,. 
2011a; Banker et al., 2011b), incentives to meet earnings targets (Kama and 
Weiss, 2013), changes in regulation (Balakrishnan et al., 2004; Holzhacker et 
al., 2015), capacity utilization (Cannon, 2014), demand uncertainty (Banker et 
al., 2013), etc. However no previous study analysed cost stickiness under the 
scope of attaining current profitability and future sales growth. Banker et al. 
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(2011b) analysed value creation by selling, general and administrative expenses 
(SGA), but they neither focused on profitability nor analysed the specific case 
of sales decreases. Kama and Weiss (2013) did not focus on profitability, they 
studied cost behaviour of firms with incentives of attaining specific targets of 
avoiding losses and decrease in annual earnings. They used dummy variables 
distinguishing between firms suspicious of attaining these targets and the remain-
ing firms, but they did not analyse the whole range of profitability or changes 
in profitability influencing resource adjustments. Moreover, no previous study 
considered the trade-off between profitability and sales growth.
The trade-off between efficiency and flexibility is an enduring postulate in 
management literature (e.g. Adler et al., 1999; Tan and Wang, 2010). Thomson 
(1967) described it as the important paradox of administration. It has been exten-
sively analysed by management research, but it has not deserved similar attention 
in accounting research. More specifically, no previous empirical research on cost 
stickiness focuses on this dilemma. Banker et al. (2011a) support the premise 
that cost behaviour is driven by deliberate resource commitment decisions made 
by forward-looking managers. Some studies found association between firm’s 
costs and future earnings per share (e.g. Anderson et al., 2007, Baumgarten et 
al., 2010), future profitability (Banker et al., 2006; Banker and Chen, 2006) 
and a ratio of increases in sales to market capitalization (Baumgarten et al., 
2010). Banker et al. (2011b) found that the potential of future value-creation 
influences resource expenditure. Weiss (2010) analysed the incidence of cost 
behaviour on analysts’ forecasts. The incidence of expectations on cost sticki-
ness has also been analysed, as previously mentioned. This study contributes 
analyzing cost stickiness under this scope: the management of firm resources and 
the dilemma between efficiency and flexibility. In this vein, we link the extant 
research on cost accounting with management research. We use one year ahead 
sales increase and change in current profitability as indicators of flexibility and 
efficiency respectively.
We use a sample of American industrial firms with at least 20 years of data 
in COMPUSTAT. We find empirical evidence that managers, in decisions on 
resource adjustment when activity decreases, consider changes in current profit-
ability, as well as future increases in sales. When enduring a decrease in activity 
managers are faced to the dilemma of cutting costs to uphold firm profitability, 
versus keeping enough resources to ensure firm’s future advantageous posi-
tion and to allow firm’s sales recovery. They consider that resource adjustment 
hinders the ability of firms to build capabilities that enable them advantages 
to attain future increases in sales, while on the other hand they also consider 
cutting costs as a measure to attain targets of profitability. We find empirical 
evidence that changes in current firm profitability and one year ahead sales in-
crease significantly influence resource adjustment decisions in periods of sales 
decrease. More precisely, we find a significant moderating effect of change in 
profitability, as well as a significant stressing effect of one year ahead sales 
increase, on resource adjustment when activity decreases. However, firms with 
high profitability are less urged to adjust resources when activity decreases, while 
firms with low profitability are more urged to cut costs in such circumstances. 
We find empirical evidence of such behaviour with firm-year observations. 
Our results provide useful insights for the management and cost accounting 
literature, enhancing our understanding of resource adjustment. They are im-
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portant for various users of financial information. They are useful in assessing 
financial statements, and more specifically costs changes. External analysts of 
financial information should be aware that resource adjustments in periods of 
sales decrease may entail immediate gains in current profitability, or may prevent 
decreases in current profitability, but it may also restrict future sales recovery and/
or sales increase. The maintenance of slack resources when activity decreases, 
even for firms facing gloomy sales expectations, may be a good indicator of a 
proactive strategic orientation towards building firm capabilities. Our results have 
significant implications for the management accounting literature, providing new 
knowledge on management decisions on resource adjustment, with respect to 
the balance between short and long term consequences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
theoretical issues and raise hypotheses, we then discuss methodological issues, 
describe the sample used in the study, explain results and raise concluding remarks.
2. Theory and hypotheses development
Stigler (1939) was the first to suggest the existence of a trade-off between 
flexibility and efficiency. Thomson (1967) described it as the important paradox 
of administration. He mentioned two opposed extremes of the organization. On 
the one hand, the technical core of the organization is concerned on scoring well 
on assessments of technical rationality. On the other hand, the upper reaches 
of the administration are concerned in providing the capacities and resources 
which allow the organization to make demands on its environment and to take 
advantage of opportunities afforded by that environment. Fuss and McFadden 
(1978) argued that the improvement in efficiency is usually a loss in flexibility. 
They argue that there is a competition over firm’s scarce resources between 
flexibility and efficiency. There are two important strategic choices, efficiency 
and flexibility, that explain management decisions. 
According to Cyert and March (1956) firms build flexibility through investing 
in resources. They introduced the notion of slack as a pool of excess resources 
that helps firms to adjust to unexpected fluctuations. Slack is potentially utilizable 
resources that can be diverted or redeployed for the achievement of organizational 
goals (George, 2005). A certain level of excess resources provides flexibility to 
experiment, take risks and make proactive choices. Firms use this slack to build 
capabilities that make firms competitive, allow them to take strategic choices, 
act as buffers in periods of economic difficulties, facilitate the adjustment to 
unanticipated contingencies, etc. Resources act as inducements to experiment, 
take risks, make proactive choices, build capabilities, as well as to take advantage 
of market circumstances and opportunities. The presence or absence of excess 
resources determines to what extent firms are able to take profit of available 
advantages. Surplus resources make it easier to pursue firms’ projects. Thompson 
(1967) argued that slack resources provide a reactive protection against threats 
and facilitate proactive initiatives. According to this author, the presence of 
excess resources provides the flexibility for a firm to decide on a course of 
action when trying to adapt to its environment. Slack resources allow firms to 
adapt to complex competitive landscapes, as well as to redeploy organizational 
means for the achievement of long term goals. They act as buffers that help to 
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pursue and build new capabilities. Damanpour (1987) and Greve (2003) argued 
that slack resources have a positive effect on innovation. Firms with no surplus 
resources are more constrained to deal with operational issues. Managers and 
employees direct their efforts to urgent matters and rush orders in such cases. 
Coordination, planning, process improvement, innovation, market research, etc. 
are set aside, or may not be properly dealt with, because any available resource 
is committed to daily or imminent operational activities, when there are no 
slack resources. Any unanticipated event is an important disruption that may 
hardly be managed in these cases. In this respect, firms with slack resources are 
in better position to make proactive choices that can be translated into future 
sales increases. They have quicker response to such circumstances. They also 
have more potential ability to respond to competitor strategies, to cater special 
needs, to deliver new orders from customers, to shift resources into or away from 
their existing markets, etc. (George, 2005). Indeed, they are in better position 
to meet increases in demand. Firms with no slack resources are more likely to 
lose opportunities for expansion of sales. They will be unable to mobilize the 
necessary resources quickly enough when opportunities for sales present them-
selves. Weiss (2001) refer to tactical flexibility as the ability of a firm to adjust 
overall output to exogenous shocks. In this study we focus on tactical flexibility 
and approach it as the achievement of future increases in sales. Mishina et al. 
(2004) and Bradley et al. (2011) found empirical evidence on the influence of 
slack on future sales growth. In this respect, when sales decrease managers may 
decide to cut resources proportionately, or almost proportionately, with respect 
to sales increases, or they may decide to cut resources to a lesser extent, because 
managers’ expectations for future sales are optimistic, but also because manag-
ers may give priority to allow futures sales recovery. The resource-based view 
(Penrose, 1959) and the behavioural theory (Cyert and March, 1963) of the firm 
argue on the beneficial effects of resources on sales growth. They provide both, 
a reactive bulwark against threats and the implementation of proactive strategic 
initiatives. According to it, managers need slack to fuel innovation and increase 
sales. Figure 1 depicts scenarios A and B, with lower and greater cost stickiness 
allowing lower and greater future sales increase respectively.
We thus formulate the following hypothesis:
H1. The attainment of greater (lower) future sales growth drives greater 
(lower) cost stickiness when activity decreases.
The adjustment of resources when activity decreases produces an immediate 
effect of improving firm income, with respect to firms that do not adjust resources, 
as well as of reducing the amount of investment used. The subsequent effect 
is an improvement in firm profitability, by increasing income and by reducing 
the investment in resources (Starr and MacMillan, 1990). The adjustment of 
resources has an additional effect of improving efficiency, because it reveals 
more clearly the scarcity of resources and stimulates their efficient use. In this 
vein, Baker and Nelson (2005) argue that firms with fewer resources are likely 
to leverage them more efficiently. According to these authors, resource con-
straints alter the behaviour by which resources are expended, forcing managers 
to apply the appropriate level and type of resource that any specific challenge 
demands. Therefore, firms more focused on the specific concern of improving 
figures of profitability will be more prone to adjust resources when they face 
decreases in activity.
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The agency theory describes the conflict between shareholders and manag-
ers. The later do not always act in the best interest of shareholders and choose 
actions to maximize their own utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Some 
authors (e.g. Jensen, 1986; Phan and Hill, 1995) argue that surplus resources 
make it easier for managers to pursue self-serving behaviours, which are not 
usually reconciled with firm performance. On the contrary, surplus resources 
often jeopardize performance. Hope and Thomas (2008) found empirical 
evidence of this management behaviour. Accordingly, firms more focused on 
profitability will give priority to capacity adjustment, the elimination of slack 
resources and the avoidance of the opportunistic behaviour of managers, thus 
preventing cost stickiness.
The lowest line depicts the initial increase in costs when sales increase (from t-2 to t-1). A symmetric 
behavior would entail that costs would decrease along this line when sales decrease (from t-1 to 
t). However, an asymmetric behavior currently takes place, which may be different according to 
deliberate firms’ decisions. In scenario A (thicker line) managers cut more resources than in scenario 
B (thinner line), given a decrease in sales in period t with respect to period t-1. Therefore, firm in 
scenario B is in an advantageous position to allow sales recovery with respect to firm in scenario 
A. Distances A and B between costs increase and decrease indicate cost stickiness for scenario A 
and B respectively. The greater slope lines depict cost curve when sales increase.
FIGURE 1
COST STICKINESS AND FUTURE SALES INCREASE
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On the other hand, the agency theory argues that incentives to meet earn-
ings targets promote self interested management behaviour. There is a bulk 
of empirical research finding that managers’ concern for meeting earnings 
benchmarks induces cost reduction (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 
2008). More specifically, Kama and Weiss (2013) found that managers faced 
to meet earnings targets diminish cost stickiness. In this vein, managers aiming 
at preserving firm profitability will cut slack resources excessively when sales 
decrease, even if it jeopardizes futures increases in sales, as depicted by scenarios 
A and B in Figure 1.
We thus formulate the following hypothesis:
H2. The attainment of favourable (unfavourable) changes in profitability 
drives lower (greater) cost stickiness when activity decreases.
3. Methodology
The purpose of our analysis is to test the influence of the attainment of future 
sales increases and current profitability on resource adjustment when activity 
decreases. We rely on the model used in the seminal study of Anderson et al. 
(2003), as well as in most of the subsequent research on cost stickiness (e.g. Dalla 
and Perego, 2013; Banker et al., 2011a), and formulate the following equation:
(1)  
log
SGAi,t
SGAi,t−1
= β0 + β1 ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
+ β2 ⋅D ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
+ β3 ⋅D ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅DNEXT ⋅ log Si,t+1
Si,t
+β4 ⋅D ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅CHROAt + β5 ⋅D ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅ log SEXPi,t+1
Si,t
+β6 ⋅D ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅ROAt + β7 ⋅D ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅ ASSTSi,t
+β8 ⋅D ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅DEBTSi,t +
t
∑βt ⋅Yi,t  
+εi,t                                                                      
where SGA indicates selling general and administrative expenses for a firm i at 
year t, S sales, ROA return on assets, CHROA change in ROA (measured as the 
difference between current and previous year ROA), SEXP sales expectations, 
and ASSTS and DEBTS the ratios of total assets (ASS) and long term debt to 
sales respectively. D and DNEXT are dummy variables indicating respectively, 
with value 1, that sales decrease with respect to previous year and that sales 
increase in the following year with respect to current year respectively (and 0 
otherwise). Y are also dummy variables, indicating that an observation belongs 
to a given year, with value 1 and 0 otherwise. They control for specific seasonal 
or temporary effects. All variables used in this study are explained in the annex.
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Changes in costs depend on changes in sales. The logarithmic specification 
of the model entails that the coefficient β1 measures the percentage increase in 
costs for a 1% increase in sales. If the traditional fixed- and variable-cost model 
is valid, upward and downward changes in costs, given changes in output, will 
be equal and consequently β2=0. Because of D takes the value of 1 when sales 
decrease between periods t–1 and t, the sum of coefficients β1+β2 measures 
the percent decrease in costs that follows a 1% decrease in output. If costs are 
sticky, the changes in costs following output increases should be greater than 
under output decreases, thus being β2<0, conditional on β1>0.
We use SGA in our dependent variable. More precisely, the dependent vari-
able is the logarithm of SGAt/SGAt-1. They are a sort of slack resources. They are 
more linked to strategic activities than most other operating costs. They include 
a bulk of resources related to managing, planning and building firm capacities. 
They include a considerable share of fixed costs. They behave more as fixed 
costs than most other operating costs, such as for example raw materials or direct 
labour. They include resources used in strategic firm activities that allow firms 
to be in an advantageous position to face competition. These resources allow 
firms to take actions to adapt to environmental circumstances, as well as to be in 
an advantageous position to attain future sales increases. SGA are an interesting 
approach for resources committed to coordination, planning, process improve-
ment, innovation, marketing research, building capabilities, etc., which enable 
firms to be in advantageous position and allow sales recovery. They are usually 
used in analyzing cost stickiness (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2012; 
Banker and Byzalov, 2014; Anderson et al., 2013). Moreover, they have been 
persistently used in empirical research on slack versus financial performance, 
as a measure of slack (e.g. Singh, 1986; Bergh and Lawless, 1998; Reuer and 
Leiblein, 2000). Anderson et al. (2007) found future positive returns related to 
increases in these costs in revenue declining periods. Therefore, we focus on 
SGA in our analysis on cost stickiness.
We are interested in analyzing how firms’ attainment of future increases 
in sales deters managers from adjusting resources in periods when activity de-
creases. According to our hypotheses stickiness is more pronounced for those 
firms being able to get greater future increases in sales. We use the interaction 
variable with the logarithm of one year ahead to current year sales (St+1/St) as 
a proxy for this effect. We assume that firms giving priority to future increases 
in sales are more able to get higher sales increases, with respect to those that 
do not give priority to supply firms’ customers or clients demand. Therefore, 
this variable offers a plausible proxy measuring comparative firms’ orientation 
to future increases in sales. Given that we also control for the effect of sales 
expectations on cost stickiness, the interaction variable with St+1/St captures the 
net effect of surplus resources devoted to meet unexpected demand fluctuations 
and/or to make proactive choices trying to increase sales above expectations. 
We are also interested in testing that the focus on firm profitability influences a 
lower degree of cost stickiness. As mentioned, studies linking flexibility or slack 
to efficiency usually use financial performance, and more precisely ROA, as an 
approach for efficiency, or merely as a measure of financial performance (e.g. 
Tan and Peng, 2003; Eben and Johnson, 2005; Tan and Wang, 2010; Bradley et 
al., 2011). Firms giving priority to current profitability will be more prone to 
apply measures that render higher profitability in the short run, and thus a more 
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favourable change in profitability, with respect to those that do not have such 
priority. We use the interaction variable with CHROA as a proxy for this effect. 
Therefore, β3 and β4 allow tests for our hypotheses H1 and H2 respectively, 
being negative and positive their hypothesized signs respectively.
Managers’ current expectations for future sales are also a factor recognised 
as influencing resource adjustment when business activity decreases. Managers 
take into account that it will take time to reacquire resources if they have been 
reduced, and to bring those resources’ performance up to earlier levels. In their 
seminal study, Anderson et al. (2003) suggested that managers are deterred from 
adjusting resources, or delay this adjustment, when they believe that the decrease 
in sales is temporary. In this vein, they found that the degree of stickiness de-
creases with longer periods of time. Indeed, Yasukata and Kajiwara (2011) found 
a significant lower resource adjustment in periods of sales decreases matched 
with managers’ optimism about future sales. As we do not have information 
on managers’ expectations with respect to sales in the following year, we use 
mechanical predictive models based on current year sales and recent changes in 
sales. Following previous research using similar parsimonious predictive models 
for earnings and cash flow prediction (e.g. Carnes et al., 2003; Kim and Kross, 
2005), we estimate the following equation:
(2)  
Si,t+1 =α0 +α1 ⋅Si,t +α2 ⋅∆Si,t
+
t
∑α t ⋅Yi,t
where ∆S is sales changes with respect to previous year, measured as St-St-1. 
We also include dummy variables for years, controlling for specific yearly 
effects. We perform fixed effects estimations of Equation (2) and calculate 
SEXP with the corresponding predicted values, which are used in the corres-
ponding interaction variable in Equation 1. A negative sign is expected for β5. 
Given the usefulness of mechanical or statistical procedures –as compared to 
expert opinion– in medical research (e.g.: Grove et al., 2000; Ægisdóttir et al., 
2006), as well as in audit research (e.g.: Koh and Killough, 1990; Simnett, 1996, 
Gadenne and Iselin, 2000; Bhimani et al., 2009)1, and the recognised human 
bias in business prediction and judgement (e.g.: Furnham and Boo, 2011; Kim 
and Prather-Kinsey, 2010; Louis et al., 2013), our variable is a plausible proxy 
for manager’s expectations for future sales.
We include the interaction variable with ROA as additional control variable, 
considering that more (less) profitable firms are less (more) urged to adjust 
resources when activity decreases. Moreover, less (more) profitable firms have 
likely higher (lower) SGA to sales ratio, thus being in less (more) need to get 
slack. Therefore a negative sign is expected for β6.
Following previous studies we also include assets and debt intensity in 
Equation 1 (ASSTS and DEBTS respectively), as additional interaction control 
variables. Firms will find significant difficulties and rigidities in depleting 
1 McKee (2003) found that auditor signalling rate for bankrupt companies, when other 
opinion modifications related to going concern issues were also considered, was similar 
to models’ prediction accuracies.
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resources, especially for firms requiring more assets to support their sales. 
Asset-depletion is in most cases unrelated to circumstantial changes in sales, 
and consequently we expect an effect of asset intensity on cost stickiness. On 
the other hand, indebtedness moderates the sticky behaviour of firms. The 
fact that indebted firms have to meet interest payments, and may be subject to 
more scrutiny from creditors, encourages managers to apply efforts to adjust 
resources. Previous studies found empirical evidence of negative and positive 
coefficients for these variables, respectively (e.g.: Chen et al., 2012; Calleja et 
al., 2006; Dalla and Perego, 2013). We consequently expect these signs for β7 
and β8 respectively. There are no expectations for the dummy variables for the 
years included in the model.
4. Sample
We use COMPUSTAT data for all industrial American firms (SIC codes 2 
and 3) with data from 1979 to 2009. We do not consider firms in the service 
industry because of their different cost structure and business approach. Table 1 
displays sample and data screening. We start with 37,730 year-data observations 
from 1,453 different firms. We remove 4,065 observations, and 32 firms, with 
missing data in sales and SGA for the current and previous years. The remaining 
1,421 firms and 33,665 observations are the available sample for our study. Sales 
decrease with respect to previous year in around 30% of observations (10,236), 
while they increase in around 70% (23,427). Almost all firms experience both, 
increases and decreases in sales, throughout all years. In an attempt to clean 
their sample from the effects of mergers, acquisitions and other special opera-
tions Dalla and Perego (2013) refused observations with more than 50% sales 
changes with respect to previous year. We begin performing our study with the 
full sample, and look for robust results applying a lower restrictive removal cri-
terion. Excluding observations with more than 70% sales change (i.e.: when the 
ratio of sales at t to sales at t-1 is lower than 0.3 and higher than 1.7) provides a 
final sample of 32,663 firm-year observations. The screening procedure leads to 
different samples depending on the availability of data for variables included in 
the different models and sample selection criteria. Given that Equation 1 includes 
lagged and forward variables, lower numbers of observations are available in the 
subsequent estimations. Some authors (e.g. Weiss, 2010; Anderson and Lanen, 
2007; Chen et al., 2012) excluded observations where sales and costs move in 
opposite directions. However, Banker and Byzalov (2014) found that this sample 
selection criterion is fundamentally flawed. These authors also criticized the 
criterion of excluding observations for which costs exceed sales, as ambiguous 
and potentially source of bias. We also refuse this criterion, because it excludes 
observations with negative income.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for our sample. Sales and total assets 
are converted into values of 2009 applying the US inflation ratio. They are lower 
in periods when sales decrease with respect to periods when sales increase. The 
average sales increase across all periods is 21.08%, while the average decrease 
is 13.16% (i.e.: 1-0,8684), with a 10.67% mean increase for the overall sample. 
The asymmetric cost behaviour can be observed for SGA, with this univariate 
analysis: on average they increase 17.41% in periods of sales increasing 21%, 
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TABLE 1
SAMPLE AND DATA SCREENING
Base sample
Number  
of  
firms
Number  
of  
observations
Industrial firms with more than 20 years in 
   COMPUSTAT (years 1979 to 2009) 1,453 37,730
Removed with missing data in S and SGA for the 
   current and previous years 32 4,065
Remaining firms and observations 1,421 33,665
      Number of observations with increases in sales 1,419 23,427
      Number of observations with decreases in sales 1,392 10,236
      Number of observations with no change in sales 2 2
Additionally removed with sales changing more than 
   70% compared to previous year 0 1,002
Remaining firms and observations with additional 
   removal 1,421 32,663
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: MEAN VALUES
  Whole  sample
Sales  
increases
Sales  
decreases
S* 4,114.676 4,293.625 3,705.918
ASS* 4,064.307 4,118.683 3,940.643
St/St-1 1.1067 1.2108 0.8684
SGAt/SGAt-1 1.1090 1.1741 0.9602
SGATS 0.2426 0.2369 0.2555
ROA 0.0818 0.1100 0.0174
ASSTS 0.9664 0.9340 1.0405
DEBTS 0.1765 0.1688 0.1941
CHROA –0.0039 0.0137 –0.0443
*  Constant values: 000 $.
S is sales, ASS total assets, SGA selling general and administrative expenses, SGATS the ratio of 
SGA to sales, ROA return on assets, ASSTS the ratio of assets to sales, DEBTS the ratio of long term 
debt to sales and CHROA the change in ROA with respect to previous year. All data refer to year t, 
with the exception of variables with t-1 subscript.
while they only decrease 3.98% in periods of sales decreasing 13.16%. The 
average SGA to sales ratio (SGATS) is 24.26% for the whole sample, being 
slightly lower (higher) in periods when sales increase (decrease). The table 
displays an improvement in most ratios when sales increase, with respect to 
periods when they decrease: ROA, CHROA, ASSTS and DEBTS. Profitability 
improves in periods of increasing sales, while it declines when sales decrease. 
The slight decrease in profitability for the overall sample can be explained in 
terms of the increasing competitive pressure.
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5. Results
5.1. Regression results
Table 3 displays estimations for Equation 1. We perform panel data regres-
sions correcting for autocorrelation disturbances. The Hausman test rejects the 
null hypothesis of no correlation between individual effects and explanatory 
variables: χ2 values of 308.68 (with 31 d.f.), 363.79 (with 36 d.f), 377.11 (with 
30 d.f.), 242.21 (with 36 d.f.) and 222.71 (with 36 d.f.) for the estimations in 
columns A, B, C, D and E respectively. As individual effects are correlated with 
the regressors in all estimations, the random effects estimator is inconsistent, 
while the fixed effects estimator is consistent and efficient. We therefore perform 
panel data estimations with fixed effects. 
All models estimated in this table present a significant goodness of fit, with 
overall R-squares ranging from 40 to 53%. The coefficients for the dummies for 
years are not displayed, because of simplicity, and because they have no interest 
for our analysis. Columns A and B display estimations with the full sample, 
while estimations in columns C to E are performed excluding observations when 
sales change more than 70% with respect to previous year. Columns A and C 
display results for the basic model for cost stickiness, while columns B, D and 
E present results for the full model formulated in Equation 1. We explain results 
referring to β coefficients with its corresponding subscripts.
Results in column A suggest the existence of the typical sticky behaviour 
for SGA for the full sample: β1 and β2 are positive and negative respectively, 
and significant at the 1% confidence level. SGA increased 0.68% per 1% sales 
increase, while they only decreased 0.58% (the combined value of β1+β2) per 
1% sales decrease. These results are in accordance with most previous research 
on cost stickiness. 
As mentioned, column B displays results for the whole sample and the full 
model formulated in Equation 1. With the exception of the interaction variable for 
asset intensity, all control variables present the expected signs, and are significant 
with p<0.05. The coefficient β5 (corresponding to the interaction variable for 
the ratio of the expected sales at t+1 to sales at t) is significantly negative with 
p<0.01, indicating the existence of the expected stressing effect of expectations 
on cost stickiness. According to this result, resource adjustment in SGA when 
activity decreases is lower for higher future expected sales, and vice-versa. The 
coefficient β6 (corresponding to the interaction variable for ROA) is significantly 
negative (at p<0.01), according to expectations, indicating that the urgency to 
adjust SGA grows with lower profitability in periods of decreasing sales, and 
vice-versa. The significant positive sign of β8 (at p<0.05) reveals a moderating 
effect of indebtedness on cost stickiness. The more firms are indebted, the more 
they are urged to meet interest payments, and consequently to adjust SGA, 
when sales decrease.
With respect to our variables of interest, the coefficient β3 (corresponding 
to the interaction variable for one year ahead increase in sales) is significantly 
negative with p<0.01, indicating a stressing effect on cost stickiness and provid-
ing support for our hypothesis H1. This finding suggests that managers focusing 
on flexibility, and therefore giving priority to future increases in sales, prefer 
to adjust less SGA when activity decreases. Managers consider that the more 
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they reduce resources, the less they will be able to achieve sales increases in 
the following year. On the contrary, the coefficient β4 (corresponding to the 
interaction variable for profitability change) is significantly positive at p<0.01. 
This result suggests that upholding current profitability influences decisions 
on adjustment in SGA when activity decreases, and provides support for our 
hypothesis H2. Managers apply greater adjustments in SGA in order to avoid 
greater decreases in current profitability when sales decrease. They must balance 
the decision with the attainment of future increases in sales.
Columns C, D and E display results with the restricted sample. As mentioned 
before, these estimations are performed excluding cases with more than 70% 
sales change with respect to previous year. Indeed, column E offers estimations 
with standardized ROA values, using industry-year means and standard devia-
tions (in the interaction variables with ROA and CHROA). Results are similar 
to those included in columns A and B. The coefficient for the interaction term 
with asset intensity is now negative and significant at p<0.01 (see β7 in columns 
D and E). As expected, asset intensity is a source of difficulties and rigidities 
when firms are faced to cut down SGA when sales decrease. We also repeat 
estimations excluding cases with more than 50% sales change, similarly to 
Dalla and Perego (2013), and results (not displayed) are substantially the same 
with respect to our variables of interest. Therefore, we find strong support for 
our hypotheses H1 and H2.
Assuming that results in columns B, D and E in Table 3 may be biased, 
because some of the covariates may be endogenous, we perform an additional 
analysis in order to provide robust results. One of our interaction variables in 
Equation 1 is built with one year ahead sales increase, which in its turn depends 
on additional factors, as for instance size (usually bigger firms grow less than 
smaller), SGA slack and increase in capacity, measured with investment in 
property plant and equipments (PPE). We regress log(Si,t+1/Si,t) depending on 
logASSi,t,, SGATSi,t and log(PPEi,t+1/PPEi,t). All variables present the expected 
significant signs (negative the former and positive the remaining variables). Given 
that the interaction variable with the corresponding residuals is significant when 
it is included in Equation 1, the suspected variable is endogenous, suggesting 
that it is plausible that managers consider future sales growth in decisions on 
resource adjustment, taking into account firm slack, size and investment. We 
consequently include additional variables in our model as instruments for this 
variable. More precisely, we use:
(3)  D ⋅ log Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅DNEXT ⋅ logASSi,t
(4)  D ⋅ log Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅DNEXT ⋅SGATSi,t
(5)  D ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅DNEXT ⋅ log PPEi,t+1
PPEi,t
as instruments for:
The influence… / Argilés-Bosch, García-Blandón, Ravenda, Valencia-Silva, Somoza 95
(6)  D ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅DNEXT ⋅ log Si,t+1
Si,t
We use the two-stages least-squares within estimator, available in STATA for 
the fixed effects option. Results with the full and restricted samples, displayed 
in columns A to C in Table 4, are essentially the same as those in Table 3. They 
are robust to a reverse casualty problem. More precisely, β3 and β4 are signifi-
cantly negative and positive (with p<0.01), respectively in all cases. Therefore, 
our results are not likely biased by endogeneity, and they provide robust sup-
port for our hypotheses H1 and H2. As additional robustness tests, we repeat 
estimations with instrumental variables and excluding observations where sales 
and SGA move in opposite directions, following Anderson et al. (2003) sample 
selection criterion. Results (not displayed) provide additional strong support for 
our hypotheses H1 and H2, given that β4 is significantly positive with p<0.01 
in all estimations, and β3 is significantly negative with p<0.05 (with p<0.1 in 
estimations with standardized ROA).
While firms frequently reverse the sign of the change in ROA (an approxi-
mately 50% average for all years), the full reversion is substantially lower: only 
27.7% and 21.9% of increases and decreases in ROA are fully reverted in the 
next year respectively. Moreover, on average only around 19% of firms move 
above and below the median ROA across the periods analyzed in our sample. 
Therefore, a substantial part of changes in ROA can be considered a change 
in efficiency, and this variable is a plausible appropriate proxy for testing our 
hypothesis on the efficiency driver.
We repeat our analysis for total operating expenses, and results (not displayed) 
are essentially the same.
5.2. Additional analysis: cost behavior when sales increase
We complete our study analyzing the trade-off between profitability and 
future sales increases when sales increase. We formulate the following equation, 
similar to Equation 1, where the dummy variable IN indicates that sales increase 
in a given period with respect to previous year: 
(7)  
log
SGAi,t
SGAi,t−1
= θ0 +θ1 ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
+θ2 ⋅ IN ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
+θ3 ⋅ IN ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅DNEXT ⋅ log Si,t+1
Si,t
+θ4 ⋅ IN ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅CHROAt +θ5 ⋅ IN ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅ log SEXPi,t+1
Si,t
+θ6 ⋅ IN ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅ROAt +θ7 ⋅ IN ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅ ASSTSi,t
+θ8 ⋅ IN ⋅ log
Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅DEBTSi,t +
t
∑θt ⋅Yi,t
+εi,t  
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The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation between 
individual effects and the explanatory variable, therefore indicating that the 
fixed effects estimator is consistent and efficient. We again find that log(Si,t+1/
Si,t) is endogenous and consequently we use the two-stages least-squares within 
estimator using:
(8)  IN ⋅ log Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅DNEXT ⋅ logASSi,t
(9)  IN ⋅ log Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅DNEXT ⋅SGATSi,t
(10) IN ⋅ log Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅DNEXT ⋅ log PPEi,t+1
PPEi,t
as instruments for:
(11) IN ⋅ log Si,t
Si,t−1
⋅DNEXT ⋅ log Si,t+1
Si,t
Table 5 shows estimations. All models present significant goodness of fit in 
all estimations. The significant positive coefficient θ2 indicates how much costs 
increase when sales increase is larger than how much they decrease when sales 
decrease. As compared with our previous findings when analyzing decreases of 
sales, this result constitutes a complementary piece of evidence regarding the 
asymmetric behaviour of costs. Asset intensity is related with firms’ rigidities 
to adjust their organizations to sales fluctuations, consequently moderating 
this greater cost increase. The significant (at p<0.01) negative sign of θ7 is in 
accordance with this expectation, while it is not for the restricted sample. The 
significant (at p<0.05) positive sign of θ8 with the restricted sample indicates a 
stressing effect of indebtedness on cost increase when sales increase, suggest-
ing that indebted firms are not urged to meet interest payments when activity 
increases. A likely explanation for this unexpected sign is that debt is a source 
of financial resources to endeavour expansion plans, with the subsequent 
achievement of growth through debt. Creditors’ requirements are less demand-
ing in periods of economic growth. They loosen conditions for indebtedness 
in favourable economic settings. However, the coefficient for this variable is 
not significant at p<0.1 with the full sample. The significant positive sign of 
the interaction variable with ROA (θ6) reveals that firms with lower previous 
profitability are more prone to save resources with respect to more profitable 
firms, even in periods of economic growth, and vice versa for firms with an 
advantageous profitability background. The sign of θ5 is negative, significant 
at p<0.01 and contrary to expectations. A likely explanation for this surprising 
sign is that expectations for future sales are mainly based on past performance. 
Managers tend to have positive expectations for future sales when they have 
experienced favourable past performance. Given that SGA are mainly fixed, 
the increase in these costs is lower than the increase in sales when they soar. 
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As for our variables of interest, the coefficient of θ3 is positive and signifi-
cant at p<0.01 in estimations with the full and restricted samples, indicating the 
existence of a stressing effect of the interaction variable for future sales increase. 
There is a positive relationship between future sales growth and increases in 
SGA in periods of increasing sales. This result suggests that firms focusing on 
flexibility keep slack in SGA as a means to build capabilities that will fuel future 
growth. On the contrary, the sign of θ4 is negative and significant at p<0.01, 
indicating that orientation to profitability moderates the higher increase in SGA 
when activity increases. Unfavorable changes in profitability are associated with 
greater SGA, while positive changes in profitability are associated with lower 
expenditures in these expenses, which means that firms aiming at improving 
immediate profitability focus on monitoring SGA. These results provide support 
for the hypothesis on the flexibility orientation, as well as on the profitability 
strategic orientation, of firms when activity increases. They suggest that the 
trade-off between profitability and sales growth exists not only when sales 
decrease, but also when sales increase.
Results with fixed effects without instruments for the suspected endogeneous 
variable are essentially the same. We do not display these results for simplicity 
reasons. 
6. Conclusions
In this study we analyze cost stickiness under the scope of the dilemma 
between current profitability and future sales growth. We use a sample of 
industrial firms with at least 20 years of data in COMPUSTAT. We focus on 
SGA considering that they are a sort of slack resources. They are substantially 
related to resources used in managing and planning, as well as in building firm 
capabilities. These resources allow firms to be in an advantageous position to 
face competition. We find evidence that the change in profitability and one 
year ahead sales increase significantly influence resource adjustment when 
firm sales decrease. According to our results, the higher (lower) the increase 
in one year ahead sales, the higher (lower) the asymmetric cost behaviour, 
considering that we control for sales expectations and other variables. Given 
that resource adjustment hinders the ability of firms to meet future increases 
in demand, managers consider that they will lose chances to increase future 
sales if they cut costs when activity decreases. We also find a significant posi-
tive moderating effect of change in profitability on cost stickiness. In periods 
of decreasing sales managers apply greater resource adjustment when they 
want to avoid greater decrease in profitability. They avoid maintaining slack 
resources despite it may curtail to take advantage of future opportunities. Our 
results suggest that managers balance advantages and drawbacks of both op-
tions, future sales increase and change in current profitability, when they must 
consider adjusting SGA when activity decreases. We also find that firms with 
high profitability are less urged adjusting resources than those with low profit-
ability when activity decreases, and vice versa for firms with low profitability. 
All control variables included in our models present the expected significant 
signs. Results are robust to different estimation methods, sample selection 
criteria and alternative variables used.
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We also find consistent results with our hypotheses when activity increases. 
SGA increase more when activity increases. In this setting future sales growth 
stresses the effect on SGA increases, while change in profitability moderates the 
effect on the increase in these resources. Our results suggest that the trade-off 
between profitability and sales growth exists not only when sales decrease, but 
also when sales increase.
Cost stickiness is not merely the result of firm failure to adjust resources when 
activity decreases. It is also a managers’ choice influenced by their expectations 
and strategies. More precisely, strategies of profitability and sales growth are 
important factors explaining resource adjustments when firm sales decrease. 
Overall, our results enhance our understanding of firms’ costs behaviour and 
provide useful insights for the management and financial accounting literature. 
Depending on their strategic choices, when activity decreases managers may 
adjust resources to meet short term targets in terms of profitability, but they may 
also keep slack resources, despite gloomy sales expectations, to meet targets 
in terms of flexibility. One of the limitations of our study is that it does not use 
data on managers’ expectations. We use mere mechanical indicators of them. 
An additional limitation is that we do not use true indicators of firms’ strategies 
on flexibility and efficiency. We have analyzed mere specific issues related to 
flexibility and efficiency. More research is needed with more accurate measures 
of both, managers’ expectations and firms’ strategies.
Annex
Variable definition
Variable Description
SGA Selling, general and administrative expenses
S Sales
D Dummy variable indicating, with value 1, that sales decrease with respect to previous 
year, and 0 otherwise
DNEXT Dummy variable indicating, with value 1, that sales increase in the following with 
respect to current year, and 0 otherwise
ROA Ratio of return on assets: operating income after depreciation divided by total assets
CHROA Change in return on assets: difference between current and previous year return on assets
SEXP Sales expectations: The predicted sales value for the following year with Equation 2
ASSTS Ratio of total assets to sales
DEBTS Ratio of long term debt to sales
Y Dummy variables indicating, with value 1, that a given observation belongs to a 
given year, and 0 otherwise
∆S Difference between current and previous year sales (when estimating Equation 2 
sales were converted into values of 2009 applying the US inflation rate)
ASS Total assets (converted into values of 2009 applying the US inflation rate)
SGATS Ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to sales
PPE Property, plant and equipment
IN Dummy variable indicating, with value 1, that sales increase with respect to previous 
year, and 0 otherwise
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